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rules.
Utah Rules of Evidence
Rule 401, Utah Rules of Evidence
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency
to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence•
Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as
otherwise provided by the Constitution of the United
States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules
applicable in courts of this state. Evidence which is
not relevant is not admissible.
Rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue
delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order
to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may,
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation,
plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.

ii

SCOTT B. MITCHELL (5111)
Kearns Building, Suite 721
136 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: (801) 532-7858
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
*

*

*

*

MARGARET B. HALL,
*

Plaintiff/Appellant,

*

vs.

*
*
*

PROCESS INSTRUMENTS AND
CONTROL, INC., a Utah
corporation,

*

APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF

*

Appeal No. 920332-CA

*

Defendant/Appellee.
*

*

*

*

Appellant (hereinafter referred to as "Mrs. Hall") submits
the following reply to the Brief Of Appellee.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Brief Of Appellee is for the most part rambling and
incoherent and appears to be aimed more at confusing the issues
than at illuminating them.

Accordingly, Mrs. Hall's reply will

focus on attempting to bring some clarity to the confusion which
Appellee has created.
II. POINT I OF APPELLEE'S "ARGUMENT" MAKES NO SENSE AT ALL.
Appellee begins point I of its Argument as follows:
One fundamental problem with [Mrs. Hall's] theory of
this case is that she never plead that [Appellee] was
the alter ego of John [i.e., Appellee's President and
sole shareholder]. Judge Rokich did comment on that
failure, but quite properly refused to allow it to
influence his decision. All of her arguments transpose
[Appellee] for John; however, she neglected to either

plead that theory or to present sufficient evidence to
support it. Margaret did not anywhere plead that
[Appellees] was merely the alter ego of John, nor did
she ask the lower court to pierce the corporate veil.
Brief Of Appellee at pages 8-9.
The short answer to this transparent red herring is that not
only has Mrs. Hall never plead any alter ego theory in this case,
but she has never cirgued that that theory is applicable.
clearly is not.1

It

Further, contrary to Appellee's nonsensical

subheading, there is nothing in Mrs. Hall's Opening Brief which
even remotely suggests that this is "an alter ego case".
Appellee next contends that "The consideration which [Mrs.
Hall] claims to have given might have been arguably consideration
to John, but not to [Appellee]."
Appellee is apparently referring to Mrs. Hall's claim that
the consideration which she gave in exchange for Appellee's
promises under the so-called "Employment Agreement" consisted of
her return promise to forego any right to alimony which she might
otherwise have had in connection with the divorce proceedings
simultaneously taking place between herself and Appellee's
President, John A. Hall (hereinafter referred to as the "Divorce
Action").

Although not explicitly stated, Appellee is evidently

arguing that Mrs. Hall's promise to forego alimony could not
constitute consideration for any return promise from Appellee

1

The only reference to "alter ego" in this entire case
was made by the trial judge during closing argument: "I don't
know why somebody didn't bring that up. Alter ego." (Trial Tr.
p. 153, line 20) Mrs. Hall can only speculate as to what the
trial judge was referring.
2

because Appellee received no benefit from Mrs. Hall's promise.2
Appellee's argument reveals a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature of consideration.

In Dementas v. Estate of Tallas.

764 P.2d 628, 632 (Utah App. 1988), this Court recognized that:
"A generally accepted definition of consideration is
that a legal detriment has been bargained for and
exchanged for a promise .... [and that] there is
consideration whenever a promisor receives a benefit or
where the promisee suffers a detriment, however
slight."
(Citations omitted)(emphasis added).
Clearly, Mrs. Hall's promise to forego her claim to alimony
in the Divorce Action constitutes a "detriment".

See, e.g.,

Gorgoza v. Utah State Road Commission, 553 P.2d 413, 416 (Utah
1976)(agreement not to challenge condemnation action constitutes
adequate consideration regardless of benefit to promisee).
Accordingly, Appellee's promises under the Employment Agreement
were supported by adequate consideration.
Appellee next argues that Mrs. Hall's promise to forego
alimony could not constitute consideration because she had
"entered into an antenuptial agreement prior to her marriage to
John which provided that in the event of divorce she would not
ask for, nor be entitled to alimony."

Brief Of Appellee at page

9.

2

The trial judge also expressed his opinion during
closing argument that there had been a failure of consideration
because Appellee did not receive any benefit from Mrs. Hall's
promise to forego alimony. (Trial Tr. p. 154, lines 12 thru 24)
3

This argument is not well taken,3

Everyone involved in the

Divorce Action, including Mr. Hall's attorney (who, not
coincidentally, also drafted the Employment Agreement on behalf
of Appellee) knew that Mrs. Hall vigorously disputed the validity
of the antenuptial agreement.4

Accordingly, Mrs. Hall's promise

to forego her right to challenge that agreement provided adequate
consideration for Appellee's return promises regardless of any
benefit received by Appellee.

Ggrgoza, 553 P.2d at 416.

Gorgoza is directly on point with the case at bar.

That

case involved a breach of contract claim in which the plaintiff
sought to recover for damages to its resort property resulting
from the construction of highway 1-80.

The contract arose in

connection with a prior condemnation action in which the
plaintiff alleged that it had "agree[d] to an order of immediate
occupancy of part of [its] land to be taken and used in the
construction of the* highway ... in exchange for a promise that
certain provisions concerning the construction of the road and
access to [its] property be incorporated into the order."

553

P.2d at 414.
When sued for its subsequent breach of the agreement, the

3

During closing argument, Judge Rokich specifically
advised Mrs. Hall's counsel that he did not consider the
antenuptial agreement to be of any relevance and, therefore, that
Mrs. Hall's counsel did not "have to argue about that." (Trial
Tr. p. 149, lines 20-21)
4

Mr. Hall's attorney testified not only that Mrs. Hall
did not consider the antenuptial agreement to be enforceable, but
that "She said they're going to go to the Supreme Court and fight
tooth and nail." (Trial Tr. p. 94, line 23 thru p. 95, line 2)
4

defendant argued that the agreement was unenforceable for lack of
consideration because "upon the filing of the condemnation
proceeding it was entitled as a matter of law to take plaintiff's
property and have an order of immediate occupancy."

553 P.2d at

415-16.
In other words, as in the case at bar, the defendant argued
that because the plaintiff had merely agreed to something it was
already under a legal obligation to do, the agreement was
unenforceable for lack of consideration.
The Supreme Court rejected the Defendant's argument, holding
that:
by its compliance with the Road Commission's request
[the plaintiff] forewent its right to challenge and to
have a hearing on those matters. It matters not that
this may or may not have proved to be of much actual
value. Sufficiency of consideration is not necessarily
measured in terms of money value equivalents. If one
party asks for and receives something he would not
otherwise be entitled to from the other, that is
consideration. It is obvious that what was done here
falls within that formula.
553 P.2d at 416 (emphasis added).
It is likewise obvious in the case at bar that, regardless
of the validity of the antenuptial agreement, Mrs. Hall's promise
to forego her right to challenge its validity and to seek an
award of alimony was adequate consideration for Appellee's return
promises.
III. SINCE OBTAINING NEW COUNSEL AND FILING HER AMENDED
COMPLAINT, THE THEORY OF MRS. HALL'S CASE HAS NEVER CHANGED.
The thread of point II of Appellee's Argument is difficult
to follow, adorned as it is with unfounded statements of fact and
5

unsupported and vague pronouncements of law.

There is one theme

that Mrs. Hall will address, however; and that is Appellee's
recurrent allegation that Mrs. Hall has continuously changed the
theory of her case.
For example, Appellee asserts that:
From Margaret's initial amendment of her complaint in
1990 until more than half way through the trial of this
matter, she claimed that the employment agreement was
in reality an agreement on behalf of the company to pay
alimony on behalf of John. It is extremely significant
that she did not claim until very late in the
proceedings that the agreement was in reality a
settlement agreement to pay its entire benefits
regardless of whether she worked.
At closing argument, Margaret asked the court to
reform the agreement to read as a settlement agreement
to require [Appellee], not her former husband, to make
a lump sum payment, payable in installments to Margaret
whether she ever worked for the company or not.
Brief of Appellee at page 13.
It is telling that Appellee fails to identify anything in
the record which supports this assertion.

Instead, Appellee

stretches beyond recognition
... a colloquy between the court and plaintiff's
counsel, [in which] Mr. Mitchell told the court that
the agreement was neither an employment agreement
(Plaintiff's original claim) nor an alimony agreement
(Plaintiff's amended claim), but "it's a settlement
agreement."
Brief Of Appellee at page 13.
The "colloquy"1 to which Appellee refers is found in the
Trial Transcript at page 150, line 1 thru page 151, line 17, in
which Mrs. Hall's counsel responds to the trial judge's request
for clarification as to whether "this is an alimony agreement or
an employment agreement?":
6

Mr. Mitchell: It's an agreement to pay Mrs. Hall ... a
thousand dollars a month to forego any right she might
have to alimony.
There was clearly a dispute as to whether Mrs.
[Hall] was entitled to alimony. There was an
antenuptial agreement. The parties disputed the ...
validity of that agreement. They went in -The Court: So you're saying this is a settlement
agreement?
Mr. Mitchell: It's a settlement agreement.
The Court: Fine.
Mr. Mitchell: You can call it alimony. You can call it
a settlement. You can call it alimony and a
settlement. It is an agreement by the defendant
corporation to pay Margaret Hall a thousand dollars
Tper month! in exchange for her agreement not to pursue
alimony in the divorce decree.
(Emphasis added).
In response to further questioning by the trial judge, Mrs.
Hall's counsel reiterated Mrs. Hall's position at page 154 of the
Trial Transcript:
Mr. Mitchell: ... It was [an] agreement [that] she
would receive a thousand dollars a month if she would
forego her right to alimony.
The Court: Okay.
Mr. Mitchell: Now, if you say that's the payment of
alimony, I guess that's fine if that's the way you see
it. But it was an agreement to forego alimony.
Alimony has separate and distinct legal rights that go
with it, and if you agree to forego it for a thousand
dollars a month, there's adequate consideration.
In short, Appellee's contention that Mrs. Hall changed the
theory of her case and

ff

[a]t closing argument, [] asked the court

to reform the agreement to read as a settlement agreement ..." is
baseless.

Since retaining replacement counsel and amending her

Complaint, the theory of Mrs. Hall's case has never wavered.
7

IV. THE DOCTRINE OF "PARTIAL INTEGRATION" IS NOT APPLICABLE.
In Point III of its Argument, Appellee contends that the
Employment Agreement:
... was clearly at a minimum a partially integrated
contract. Margaret's claim has never been that the
employment agreement was not at least a partially
integrated agreement, otherwise she would have been
faced with a myriad of nasty alternatives, e.g.,
"Statute of Frauds" and Res Judicata.
Brief Of Appellee at page 15.
Again, Appellee fails to explain what it means by this
curious contention.

There was certainly no finding of fact or

conclusion of law that the Employment Agreement was at least
"partially integrated".

Further, Mrs. Hall's claim that the

parties never intended that she would go to work for Appellee
under the Employment Agreement is obviously inconsistent with any
acknowledgement that the agreement is partially integrated.
Likewise specious is Appellee's contention that Mrs. Hall would
somehow be faced with Statute of Frauds and res judicata problems
unless the agreement were at least partially integrated.
Appellee also makes a number of misrepresentations in point
III of its Argument which Mrs. Hall believes need to be
addressed.
First, Appelle.e misrepresents that
"Mr. Ennenga [the attorney that drafted the Employment
Agreement on behalf of Appellee and who also
represented Mr. Hall in the Divorce Action] was
emphatic, and despite persistent cross examination by
Margaret's counsel, did not waiver (sic) on the point
that the employment agreement was not entered into upon
consideration of Margaret waiving her claimed right
to alimony."
8

Brief Of Appellee at page 18 (Appellee's emphasis).
In point of fact, on direct examination Mr. Ennenga did
unequivocally testify on Appellee's behalf that the Employment
Agreement was not entered into by Appellee in consideration for
Mrs. Hall's agreement to forego her claim to alimony in the
Divorce Action. (Trial Tr. p. 118, lines 10-13) However, on
cross-examination, Mr. Ennenga not only wavered on that point, he
did a complete flip-flop, testifying that he did not know one way
or the other whether Appellee's promises under the Employment
Agreement were made in exchange for Mrs. Hall's promise to forego
her claim to alimony.

(Trial Tr. p. 137, line 14 thru p. 138,

line 3) Mr. Ennenga also testified that, even though it was he
that drafted the Employment Agreement, the terms of the agreement
were neither negotiated nor discussed in his presence (Trial Tr.
p. 138, line 3-21), that the terms of the agreement had been
arrived at by the parties prior to his involvement (Trial Tr. p.
138, lines 9-16), and that he merely "put in there what [he] was
told to put in there

" (Trial Tr. p. 137, line 11 thru p. 138,

line 3)
In short, Mr. Ennenga's testimony with respect to the terms
of the Employment Agreement, including the consideration
bargained for by the parties, was anything but "emphatic" and
unwavering.
Appellee also misrepresents that Mrs. Hall failed "to advise
the court that the statement by Judge Rokich [i.e., that 'I
believe this is nothing more than an alimony agreement.'] was at
9

the close of Plaintiff's evidence."
(Appellee's emphasis).

Brief of Appellee at page 17

That is simply not true.

To the

contrary, Mrs. Hall specifically advised the Court that Judge
Rokich's statements were made "When Defendant moved for dismissal
after Mrs. Hall rested her case ..."

Appellant's Opening Brief

at page 16.
Finally, Appellee attempts to belatedly rehabilitate Mr.
Hall's preposterous trial testimony by offering that "The fact
that [Mr. Hall'] meunory of events which had transpired ten years
previously became confused upon cross-examination proves
nothing."

Brief Of Appellee at page 19.

is referring to is unclear.

Exactly what Appellee

What is clear is that Mr. Hall's

trial testimony was in most relevant respects identical to his
previous deposition testimony. (Trial Tr. p. 66, line 4 thru p.
69, line 16; p.86, line 23 thru p. 88, line 25; and p. 103, line
5 thru p. 105, line 24) Mr. Hall's memory was not confused; to
the contrary/ he has steadfastly maintained his preposterous
fabrications throughout this litigation.
V. MR. TURLEY'S TESTIMONY WOULD CLEARLY HAVE BEEN RELEVANT AND HE
SHOULD HAVE BEEN ALLOWED TO TESTIFY.
In point IV of its Argument, Appellee first contends that
the trial court's disallowance of the testimony of Brent Turley
was proper because the "Turley episode ... was remote in time
from the facts of this case, having occurred some five years
previously."

Brief Of Appellee at pages 20-21.

According to

Appellee, the the fact that the "Turley episode" occurred some
five years earlier lessened its probative value to such an extent
10

that it had become irrelevant.
The short answer to this contention is that the trial
judge's ruling on the admissability of Mr. Turley's testimony had
nothing to do with remoteness.

The specific ruling was that:

"The objection is sustained. You've got to show more
than just one occasion. That may be a method under
which he operates, but nevertheless I don't see where
it's relevant to this case.
(Trial Tr. p. 61, lines 2-6) 5
Even if the trial judge's ruling had been based upon
remoteness, however, Appellee fails to offer any explanation as
to why the passage of five years would have had any effect on the
probative value of Mr. Turley's testimony, let alone explain how
it would render the testimony completely irrelevant.

Appellee

also fails to recognize that a trial judge does not have
discretion to exclude relevant evidence so easily.
In Utah, "[a]11 relevant evidence is admissible ..."
402, Utah Rules of Evidence.

Rule

"'Relevant evidence' means evidence

having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more probable ...
than it would be without the evidence."

Rule 401, U.R.E.

Mr. Turley's testimony would have been that Mr. Hall had
attempted to use an employment contract with his company
(containing terms virtually identical to those at issue in the
5

This ruling is particularly puzzling. If Mr. Turley's
testimony would have made it more probable that Mr. Hall had a
method of operating whereby he used employment contracts with his
company as consideration for his personal obligations, the
testimony would clearly have been relevant. See Rule 401, Utah
Rules of Evidence.
11

case at bar, including that Mr. Turley would not be required to
go to work for Mr. Hall's company) as the down-payment on his
purchase of Mr. Turley's home.

This testimony would clearly have

had a tendency to make it more probable that the consideration
given by Mrs. Hall in the case at bar for Appellee's obligations
under the so-called Employment Agreement was not her promise to
go to work for Appellee, but, rather, was her promise to forego
her claim to alimony in the Divorce Action.
By definition, then, Mr. Turley's testimony would have been
relevant to the adequacy of consideration issue.

Accordingly,

Mr. Turleyfs testimony was admissible pursuant to Rule 402,
U.R.E.
Notwithstanding its admissability, however, the trial judge
could have excluded Mr. Turley's testimony under Rule 403,
U.R.E., if he had determined that its probative value was
"substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence."

Terry v. Zions Co-op.

Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d 314, 323 (Utah 1979).
judge made no such determination.

The trial

Instead, he simply ruled that

the proffered testimony was not relevant.
The very caselaw upon which Appellee relies demonstrates
that the trial judge abused his discretion in not allowing Mr.
Turley to testify.
In Terry v. Zions Co-op. Mercantile Institution, 605 P.2d
12
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testimony.

However, even if it had been the basis for his

ruling, the trial judge obviously did not engage in the requisite
"delicate weighing process" to arrive at a determination that the
remoteness of the prior incident lessened its probative value to
such an extent that it was outweighed by other considerations
"such as those of surprise, unfairness, confusion of the jury,
and prolonging of a trial."

Id.

Accordingly, under Terry, Mrs.

Hall submits that the asserted remoteness of the prior incident
cannot provide a basis for upholding the trial judge's ruling
that Mr. Turley's testimony was inadmissable.
The Terry decision is also of particular significance due to
the fact that there was only one prior incident at issue in that
case.

In the case at bar, the only explanation given by the

trial judge for his decision to exclude Mr. Turley's testimony
was that "you've got to show more than one other occasion."

As

confirmed by the facts of Terry. that only "one other occasion"
was involved is not a critical factor.

See also, Leger

Construction, Inc. v Roberts. Inc.. 550 P.2d 212 (Utah
1976)(evidence relating to another similar construction job);
Weber Basin Water Conservancy District v. Ward, 347 P.2d 862
(Utah 1959)(evidence related to a prior sale of real property);
McCormick On Evidence § 198 (4th ed.)("[I]t seems clear that
contracts of a party with third persons may show the party's ...
course of dealing and thus supply useful insights into the terms
of the present agreement.

Indeed, even if there are but one or

two such contracts, they may be useful evidence.").
14

Accordingly,

Mrs.

Hall respectfully submits that Mr. TurleyVs testimony shoul d
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With respect to the former argument, as demonstrated above,
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Even if Mr, Turley f s testimony 1 lad been offered to
prove Mr I la 11 f s character, however, Rule 404(b) would not have
been an obstacle because that rule specifically provides that
character evidence is admissible for the purpose of proving
"intent". See State v. Brown, 577 P. 2d 135 "(Utah 1978) (single
unrelated offense involving similar criminal activity by
defendant proper! y admitted as evi dence of defendant f s i ntei I t:).
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of the "three other witnesses who gave direct testimony" (i.e.,
Mr. Hall, Mr. Hall's attorney, Mr. Ennenga, and Appellant), two
of the witnesses (Mr. Hall and Appellant) gave contradictory
testimony.

The third witness (Mr. Ennenga) testified that he did

not know one way or the other whether Appellee's promises under
the so-called Employment Agreement were made in exchange for Mrs.
Hall's promise to forego her claim to alimony. (Trial Tr. p. 137,
line 14 thru p. 138, line 3).

Mr. Ennenga further testified

that, even though it was he that drafted the Employment
Agreement, the terms of the agreement were neither negotiated nor
discussed in his presence (Trial Tr. p. 138, lines 3-21), that
the terms of the agreement had been arrived at by the parties
prior to his involvement (Trial Tr. p. 138, lines 9-16), and that
he merely "put in there what [he] was told to put in there ..."
(Trial Tr. p. 137, line 11 thru p. 138, line 3 ) .
Under the circumstances, Mrs. Hall respectfully submits that
Mr. Turley's testimony would have been extremely important
corroboration in what is essentially a swearing match between
herself and Mr. Hall.
Likewise unpersuasive is Appellee's suggestion that Mrs.
Hall's proffer of the general substance of Mr. Turley's testimony
was sufficient to render harmless the trial judge's refusal to
allow Mr. Turley to testify in person.

In a case such as this,

where credibility is of such obvious importance, proffered
testimony is simply not an adequate substitute for the real
thing.

Otherwise, why not conduct the entire trial by proffer.
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CONCLUSION
Mrs,

Hal 1 i espectfu.1 ly requests that the District Court's
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instructions for further proceedings consistent with this Court:
decision.
DATED til lis X

y ' day of January

"

Sfcott B. Mitchell
Attorney for Appellant

MAILING CERTIFICATE
Undersigned certifies that he mailed four copies of the
foregoing Appellant's Reply Brief to James A, Mclntyre, Esq., 31
East 4500 South, Suite 3, Salt Lake City, Utjah 84107, this
day of January, 1993.

••7

